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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Section 78A-3-102(3)G). This case has been transferred to the Utah Court of
Appeals and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-4103(2)G)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW

a. Issue: Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs-Appellants'
Fraud claim against the real estate broker based on an agreement dated August 18, 2008
containing a broker exculpatory clause, and the agreement was signed only after all
broker services were rendered.

Preserved: Appeal from Minute Entry dated October 31, 2012, (Rec. 323)
Standard of Review: Whether a Motion for Summary Judgment was properly
granted is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Reynolds v. Bickel, 307 p.3d
570, 572 (Utah 2013)

b. Issue: Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment against

Appellants' claim of Breach of Fiduciary Duty against the real estate broker because
Appellants did not have an expert witness, even though the breach resulted from
fraudulent behavior of the broker, and the issues regarding fraud, misrepresentation and
nondisclosure are issues a jury easily understands?

Preserved: Appeal from Order on Defendants Coldwell Banker Commercial and
Duane Bush's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated April 21, 2104, (Rec. 1363)
4
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Standard of Review: Whether a Motion for Summary Judgment was properly
granted is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Reynolds v. Bickel, 307 p.3d
570, 572, fn 2 (Utah 2013)

c. Issue: Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the
accountant pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 58-26a-602 and against Appellants, dismissing
their negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty claims when the accountant
G

was paid to provide attestation services directly to Appellants in a due diligence meeting
prior to purchasing the company they were investigating, when the only purpose of the
meeting was to benefit Appellants, and when the same created an accountant-client
relationship with Appellants?

Preserved: Appeal from Findings and Order on Defendant Child Van Wagoner &
Bradshaw and J. Russton Bradshaw's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated April 21,
2014. (Rec. 1368)

Standard of Review: Whether a Motion for Summary Judgment was properly
/'..'.\

granted is a _question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Reynolds v. Bickel, 307 p.3d
570, 572, fn 2 (Utah 2013)

d. Issue: Whether the meaning of the statute requiring that an accountant or client
be identified in writing that the professional services performed on behalf of the client
were intended to be relied upon in order to establish liability, is satisfied by many
writings, emails and documents from the accountant which relate to the due diligence
services he is performing to buyers and the specific due diligence meeting of the
particular buyer.

5
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Preserved: Appeal from Findings and Order on Defendant Child Van Wagoner &
@

Bradshaw and J. Russton Bradshaw's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated April 21,
2014. (Rec. 1368)

Standard of Review: Whether a Motion for Summary Judgment was properly
granted is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Reynolds v. Bickel, 307 p.3d
570, 572, fn 2 (Utah 2013).

e. Issue: Whether the Trial Court erred in disallowing Appellants to have
Instruction No. CV1811 of the Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, on
Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure read to the jury, because that instruction had
an element of duty, and the court had earlier dismissed a negligence action which had a
duty element.

Preserved: Oral ruling by Trial Court at Trial Disallowing Jury Instruction on
February 20, 2014 (Rec. 1828 p. 11-12)

Standard of Review:

The element of duty in connection with Fraudulent

Nondisclosure is an issue oflaw. Yazd v. Woodside, 143 P.3d 283 (Utah 2006).
Questions of law are reviewed on appeal for correctness. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40
P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002).

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is taken from the lower court's final judgment after a verdict in favor
ofDefendants-Appellees Child Van Wagoner & Bradshaw and J. Russton Bradshaw after
a trial on their fraud claim. The trial court had earlier granted summary judgment in favor
of Bradshaws on their Motion to Dismiss the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty
claims, which has been appealed. The Court also disallowed a jury instruction from the
Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition concerning concealment or fraudulent
nondisclosure which has been appealed.
This appeal is also taken from a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Coldwell
Banker Commercial and Duane Bush dismissing Appellants' fraud claim against them.
Summary Judgment was also granted in favor of Coldwell Banker and Bush dismissing
Appellant's breach of fiduciary claim against them, which is appealed.

r·,
'-:).I

7

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about July, 2008, David Ball and Brad Ball, individually and as President
for Reperex, Inc. (hereafter collectively "Balls") were looking to acquire a new business

and contacted Coldwell Banker Commercial (CBC) and its agent, Mr. Duane Bush. (Rec.
2)
2. CBC through its agent Bush introduced Plaintiffs-Appellants David Ball and
Brad Ball (the Balls) to a business for s~le called May's Custom Tile owned by Steve
May as a prospective business for sale. (Rec. 2) After several meetings and a due
diligence meeting on August 11, 2008, The Balls offered to purchase the business. (Rec.
2)
3. Bush has been a real estate agent for 12 years at the time of his 2010 deposition,
and prior to his being a real estate agent, Bush owned and managed two businesses during
the period between 1983 to 2001, wherein he gained experience regarding what is
relevant in the purchase and sale of a business. (Rec. 1223-1224)
4. At the time in which The Balls contacted CBC and Duane Bush to show them
business properties, Duane Bush represented to David Ball and Brad Ball in his office at
CBC that he was a real estate agent acting for Coldwell Banker as his broker. (Rec. 205208)
5. On July 18, 2008, Duane Bush represented to both David Ball and Brad Ball
that he was acting as a fiduciary to both the Sellers and the Buyers in a dual agency
capacity in the subject transaction. (Rec. 1259, 1261)
6. Duane Bush himself plainly admitted in his sworn deposition dated October 14,
2010 two different times that he had a fiduciary duty to both the Seller and the Buyer.
See Deposition of Duane Bush, (Rec. 204, 1225)
8

7. Duane Bush received from May's accountant Bradshaw an email on March 27,
2008 with a 2006 profit and loss statement made the same date and time, for May's
Custom Tile showing that the company made $74,000 in profits in 2006, and wherein
Bradshaw stated to Bush in the email that the 2006 books were "a bit shakey." (Rec.
Q

1228-1233)
8. Bush concealed this statement to the Balls, and he also concealed the email he
received from the Company accountant that the books were "a bit shakey." (Rec. 1199,
par 36)
9. Bush made false fraudulent adjustments to the numbers supplied by Bradshaw
in order to misrepresent the profits shown by Bradshaw to be much higher. Rec. 12351239)
10. Bush then drafted falsified profit and loss statements showing the 2006 profits
to be $371,742.00 and higher, which were the only profit and loss statement which Bush
showed the Balls purporting to come from Steve May. (Rec. 1240, 1260 par 4, 1262 par
4)
11. The Balls also requested Bush to tell them what was the Utah licensing
requirements in order to run the business they were purchasing, whereupon Bush
represented that they did not have to worry about any issue with a state license, and that
Mr. May would assist them until they got it. (Rec. 1260 par 5, 1262 par 5)
12. Bush knowingly and recklessly represented to the Balls that the Balls could
get a contractor's license in 90 days, while he knew or recklessly should have known that
it actually took 3 years to get a contractor's license in this line of work. (Rec. 207 par 1314, 210 par 13-14)

9

13. Bush also represented to the Balls that Promontory, a real estate developer,
~

was a large account of the Tile company, which provided 40% of the business to the
company in 2007 and in 2008. (Rec. 1260 par 6, 1261 par 6)
14. Bush represented to the Balls that all accounts including Promontory would
continue to make the company prosperous in the future as it had hitherto been. (Rec. ·
1246)
15. In fact Bush knew on April 3, 2008 that Promontory had gone bankrupt as he
acknowledged in an email of the same date, and that there would be no new business
coming from it to the business, which resulted in a 40% decline in business to the Tile
company at the time Promontory filed for bankruptcy. (Rec. 1258)
16. Bush never showed the Balls the email he sent on April 3, 2008 indicating that
Promontory was in bankruptcy and that he knew that it was in bankruptcy. (Rec. 1260,
par 6)
17. David Ball specifically asked Bush about a vital concern he had regarding
whether there was any commingling between May's Custom Tile company and May's
Granite company, both companies of which were owned by Steve May. (Rec. 1260, par
7, 1262, par 7)
18. Mr. Bush made it crystal clear that there could not be any commingling
between the company; otherwise Coldwell Banker absolutely could not market the
business in any degree .. (Rec. 1260, par 7, 1262, par 7)
19. In fact, May's accountant Bradshaw told Bush in his March 27, 2008 email,
"Keep in mind that there was a lot of intercompany commingling between Mays Tile and
Mays Granite." (Rec. 1228)

~

20. Bush concealed from the Balls this email where the accountant admitted that
there was "a lot of intercompany commingling." (Rec. 1260 par 7, 1262 par 7)
10
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21 On August 18, 2008, The Balls closed the transaction to purchase May's Tile
from Steve May wherein they signed an Agreement for Sale of Assets (hereafter
"Agreement"). (Rec. 148-183)
22 In addition to the agreement and other closing documents was a document
entitled Broker Acknowledgment which was an agreement between the Balls and CBC.
(Rec. 182-183)
23. All of the services of Bush and CBC had been performed at the time of closing
on August 18, 2008, and all of the due diligence by The Balls had already taken place by
such closing date. (Rec. 206 par 5-7, 209 par 5-7)
24. During all of the time from the first encounter between the Balls and CBC
during the due diligence and prior to closing, Balls were never told anything about any
document which would limit the liability of either Bush or CBC. See Affidavits of David
Ball and Brad Ball. (Rec. 206 par 6, 209 par 6)
25. The Broker Acknowledgment had the following provision:
Buyer hereby acknowledges that Buyer is relying on its own inspection of
the involved business and the representations of the Seller and not of
COLDWELL BANKER COMMERCIAL and/or any of its agents or
employees with regards to the prior operating history of the business, the
value of the assets being purchased and all other material facts of Seller in
completing the transaction as evidenced by the Agreement for Purchase and
Sale together with its attachments. (Rec. 182)
26. The Broker Acknowledgment went on to say:
"Buyer further acknowledges that neither COLDWELL BANKER
COMMERCIAL nor any of its agents and/or employees have verified the
representations of the Seller, and should any representations be untrue,
Buyer agrees to look solely to Seller for relief and to indemnify
COLDWELL BANKER COMMERCIAL, its agents and employees and
hold them harmless in connection with all losses and damages caused to
Buyer thereby." (Rec. 182)
27. The Balls understood the Broker Acknowledgment to mean that the Broker
made no verification of the information which Sellers, Bush and CBC had represented to
11

them, and since they made no verification, Bush and CBC therefore had no information to
(.$)

either corroborate or deny the representations which Seller, Bush and CBC made to The
Balls. See Affidavits of David Ball and Brad Ball. (Rec. 206 par 9, 209 par 9)
28. The Balls had no understanding nor reason to understand that Bush and CBC
in fact did verify information which Bush and CBC misrepresented to them, and that their
representations were verified by Bush and CBC to be false. (Rec. 206 par 9-12, 209 par
9-12)
29. Bush and CBC all purposely withheld and concealed information they knew
would show the falsity of their representations during the entire due diligence of the of
the company by the Balls. (Rec. 206 par 9-16, 209 par 9-17)
30. Balls would not have signed the Broker Acknowledgment document had they
known that Bush and CBC had obtained verification and had full knowledge that the

@

representations made by themselves and sellers were false. See Affidavits of David Ball
. and Brad Ball. (Rec. 206 par 14, 209 par 15)
31. CBC and Bush moved for judgment on the pleadings on Balls' claim for fraud
against Bush and CBC based on the exculpatory agreement, and also on Balls' claim
against Bush and CBC for breach of fiduciary duty. (Rec. 131)
32. The Trial Court dismissed the Balls' fraud claim and let stand Balls' Breach of
Fiduciary Duty claim after a hearing on September 18, 2012 and in a written ruling dated
October 31, 2012. (Rec. 323-324)
33. CBC and Bush later moved for Summary Judgment after discovery on The
Balls' Breach of Fiduciary Duty claim alleging that the Balls could not prove a breach of
fiduciary duty claim without an expert witness, notwithstanding the Balls' argument and

~

evidence that Bush's intentional and reckless false representations, being a breach of
fiduciary duty, was well within the purview of the understanding of a jury. (Rec. 957)
12

34. The Court, granted CBC and Bush's Motion for Summary Judgment after a
hearing on March 19, 2014. (Rec. 1363)
3 5. The ruling granting CBC and Bush Summary Judgment indicated that since
the sale of the business was of a complex nature, the Balls needed an expert witness to
show negligence wherein the broker fell below a duty of reasonable care, but the oral
ruling and written order inexplicably mentioned nothing regarding the intentional,
reckless false representations and negligent fraud which was well within the
understanding of any jury and which also constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. (Rec.
1364, 1824 p 68)
36. Defendants Child Van Wagoner & Bradshaw, an accounting firm, and Russ
Bradshaw, one of the firm's partner accountants, (collectively hereinafter Bradshaws)
were hired on a contract basis by Steve May to prepare tax returns and also to provide a
variety of consulting and accounting consulting services for Mays Custom Tile and May's
Granite. (Rec. 1045 par 4, 1138 par 31-35)
3 7. May's Tile and Granite companies had an in-house bookkeeper which
maintained daily sales and bank deposit entries; however, all of the accounting journal
entry financial transactions were made by Bradshaws and were marked "RUSS".
Bradshaws also kept many file notes on the books. (Rec. I 138 par 35, 1148-1150,
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 51, 59, 67)
38. Periodically, Mays would provide its Quickbooks files to Bradshaw who
would use the files presented to prepare Mays' tax returns, and also to provide accounting
services therewith. (Rec. 1045 par. IO)
39. When May put May's Custom Tile on the market to sell, he hired Bradshaw to
provide consulting services to Bush and to further provide attestation services and to
answer questions to prospective buyers of the company, including Mark Cobb, a previous
13

prospect, and also to the Balls. These consulting services was manifest in numerous
~

emails to and from Bradshaw. (Rec. 1118-1138, 1195 par 7-10, 13-14)
40. Bradshaw admits in deposition that the advice to Bush's second prospect, now
the Balls, was ongoing, where he said, "I was asked to provide similar documents to -- to
Duane Bush as we had before. Many of them were the same documents. Nothing
changed." (Rec. 1170, lines 7-20)
41. Bradshaw was hired to provide attestation services to the Balls, which
included preparing the books for the due diligence review and sending Eric Dow of his
office staff to Mr. May's office to update the books by making accounting journal entries
3 business days before a due diligence meeting to be held on August 11, 2008, and
conducting attestation services at that due diligence hearing. (Rec. 1135, par 7-28, 1202,
par. 8-29, 1141 p. 38 line 10 thru p. 40 line 11, 1144.p. 8 line 10 thru p. 11 line 23)
42. Bradshaw was further hired to prepare the 2007 tax returns and make journal
entries in the books in such a way as to knowingly conceal the misrepresentation to
buyers of the company of the purported 2006 cash basis profits of$310,000.00 on the tax
return when the 2006 profits were actually $74,000.00. (Rec. 1160-1161, Int. 9)
43. The 2007 tax returns of the Tile and the Granite companies were also prepared
by Bradshaw in such a way as to commingle the Tile and Granite books so as to
knowingly conceal the fact that the 2007 Tile profits to be positive $276,000 and the
Granite profits to be Negative $273,442.00. (Rec. 1118, 1199 par 37-40, Plaintiffs'
Exhibits 4 7, 50, 51)
44. The 2007 Tile tax returns were also prepared early to satisfy a request of a
buyer of the company, Mark Cobb. (Rec. 1120)
45. Bradshaws also prepared the 2008 tax return in such a way as to conceal their
misrepresentations to the Balls that the 2006 cash basis profits of the company were much
14

higher than they actually were. (Rec. 1153-1154, 1196 par 14-15 & 31-36, 1160-1161,
Int. 9, 1155)
46. The Balls, the Seller May and Bradshaws all agreed that Bradshaws would
directly provide attestation and verification services to the Balls in the Balls' August 11
Due Diligence Meeting to purchase the company, and that the Balls were Bradshaws'
client for those services, for which May paid Bradshaw in the Balis' behalf pursuant to
Bradshaws' billing to May. Bradshaw did provide the Attestation services (Rec. 1128,
1827 at page 79, lines 16-20, 1195 par 8-28, 1196, par 8-28, 1141 p. 38 line 10 thru p. 40
line 11)
4 7. Bradshaws knew that the meeting was a due diligence meeting for the The
Balls before they bought the company and that he was hired to perform the attestation and
verification services directly to the Balls. (Rec. 1827 at page 79, lines 16-20)
48. There was no other purpose of the meeting than for Bradshaw to provide the
due diligence services to the Balls to which all parties agreed. The Balls had no other
way of verifying the records of the company than by their due diligence at that due
diligence meeting. (Rec. 1195 par 8-28)
49. Bradshaws also invoiced The Balls directly for the services he rendered in
preparing for and attending the deposition of Plaintiffs, and for responding to Plaintiffs'
subpoenas. (Rec. 1163-1164)
50. At that due diligence meeting, Bradshaw provided due diligence services, and
produced reports to the Balls from his own computer at his office. (Rec. 1046 par. 13)
51. At the due diligence meeting, Bradshaws provided the 2006 tax return, the
2007 tax return which they prepared, to Bush, and to the Balls. Bradshaws also provided
accounting reports specifically to validate the veracity of the 2006 and the 2007 tax
returns and income. (Rec. 1196 par 17-18, 1203 par. 17-18)

15
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52. Bradshaws also s~owed the Balls a sales report for the Tile company for the
(0

months of January through July, 2008 in addition to showing other information and
answering questions which the Balls asked. (Rec. 1197 par 21, 24, 1204 par 21, 24)
53~ Bradshaw further demonstrated that he knew that the $600,000.00 sales for the
first half of 2008 was false, as he prepared the 2008 tax return showing only $303,000.00
cash sales. (Rec. 1180)
54. The Balls specifically asked Bradshaws in the August 11 due diligence
meeting whether there was any commingling between the Granite and Tile companies.

Mr. Bradshaw spoke clearly to the Balls saying that there was no significant commingling
between them at all, except for insignificant amounts. (Rec. 1136 par 16-17)
55. This was a false statement, as Bradshaw admitted in his March, 2006 email to
Bush and Cobb that the expenses were "shakey" and that "there was a lot of commingling
@

between Mays Tile and Mays Granite." (Rec. 1118)
56. That very email contained a 2006 profit and loss statement showing the 2006
profits to actually be $74,000. (Rec. 1228-1233)
57. Bradshaw and May would not allow the Balls to take any of the written
reports from Bradshaw's office. They had to review them at the office and were required
to leave them there and not take them. Rec. 1198 par 30, 1205 par 29)

:1":\.

"'21

58. At the August 11 Due Diligence meeting, the Balls specifically requested
Bradshaws to find out why the 2007 books had a credit entry on them for about $120,000
-$130,000.00. Bush inquired from Bradshaw the reason for the credit, and Bradshaw
concealed from the Balls that the credit entry was of vital significance. See Declaration
II of David Ball, (Rec. 1198 par. 22-24, 29)
59. In fact the credit was one of the very entries which Bradshaws themselves
made 3 days after the due diligence meeting, and before the Balls bought the company, in
16

order to knowingly conceal $240,000.00 of the 2006 falsified profits on the 2006 tax
return, according to Bradshaw's testimony at trial (Rec 1827 p 45 line 10 top 47 line 24,
p 79 line 22 top 81 line 2, p 95 line 1 top 96 line 16)
60. Bradshaws' bad debt entries to conceal the falsified 2006 sales and profits
were made after having been directly prompted to do so as a result of the Balls' inquiry.
(Rec. 1827 p 95 line 1 top 96 line 16, 1155-1156)
61. The Balls purchased the company after the due diligence meeting with
Bradshaws based on the false representations made by Bradshaws' attestation services
that he provided at the due diligence meeting, which Bradshaws knowingly made, and
upon the lack of vital information regarding bad debt entries which Bradshaws concealed
from the Balls, and also after the Balls s relied on as coming from a reputable CPA. (Rec.
1139 par 36-39)
62. The Balls would have never bought the Tile company had they known that the
bad debt which was concealed from them existed, that the Promontory sales account had
stopped when it filed for bankruptcy, that they needed a contractor's license which would
take them years to obtain, that the actual sales and net income was drastically lower for
2006 and 2007 than that which was represented to them and the true information and bad
debt having been concealed from them. (Rec. 1199 par 39, 41)
63. The Balls tried to make a go of the Tile business they purchased, but were
unable to do so because of its poor performance which would not have happened if the
business were as financially strong as the income and profits information and other
information showed to them by Bush and Bradshaw had been true. (Rec. 1826 p. 8 line
11 top. 9 line 19)
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65. The Balls lost their down payment they made on the purchase, together with
seller financing payments, their investments into the business they made in trying to keep
it afloat, and other incidental and consequential damages, and interest. (Rec. 1200 par 42)
66. The Balls filed suit against Mr. May, who later filed for bankruptcy.
67. The Balls also filed suit against Mr. Bradshaw and his firm for fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation, and Mr. Bush and Coldwell Banker for
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. (Rec. 1)
68. Mr. Bradshaw and his company moved for summary judgment b~sed on Utah
Code Ann.§ 58-26a-602 which shields an accountant from liability·without privity of
contract, except for fraud, based on there being no contractual relationship between Mr.
Bradshaw and the Balls, and the Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of
Bradshaw, except on the fraud claim. Rec. 1025, 1368)
69. A 4 day trial before a jury was held between Appellants and Mr. Bradshaw and
his firm on the last existing fraud claim against the accountant. (Rec. 1825-1828)
70. At trial, Appellants orally moved the Court to allow the jury instruction for
fraudulent nondisclosure known as Instruction No. CV1811 of the Model Utah Jury
Instructions, Second Edition (MUTI 2d), and the trial court denied their oral motion to
include the instruction, in a hearing on the last day of trial, by reasoning that the issue of
whether the element of duty--an element of the MUJI instruction on fraud--was a
negligence issue, and therefore the Court disallowed the instruction because it already
ruled on the negligence issue in summary judgment. (Rec. 1828 p. 6 line 13 top. 12 line
4)

71. The jury rendered a verdict against the Balls and in favor of Mr. Bradshaw.
~

(Rec 1790)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Fraud against Broker. This Court should reverse the Judgment on the Pleadings

against Appellants rendered by the lower court in its minute entry, because the broker
should not be allowed to be protected from fraud on an exculpatory agreement with
buyer. Case law has overruled the unpublished opinion saying that no agreement can
erase liability for a real estate agent for dishonesty. Furthermore, the Broker
misrepresented the exculpatory agreement by saying that he had not verified seller
information, when he had verified it and had filtered the truthful information away from
the buyer which would have verified the false information the Seller gave the Buyers
through the broker.
Breach of Fiduciary by Broker, no expert is needed. The Court should reverse

summary judgment against Appellants which was entered for not having an expert
witness which the trial court requred. The issues regarding breach of fiduciary duty are
not complex, as they involve nondisclosure fraud, which case law show to be the same
elements as breach of fiduciary duty. Representing profits to be many times more than
they were, and the representing that income will continue while concealing the
bankruptcy of a customer which brought 40% of the income-are well within any jury's
understanding.
Negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by accountant. Summary Judgment in

favor of the accountant for his defense of a statute Utah Code Ann§ 58-26a-602 to shield
himself from liability should be reversed because there was in fact privity of contract
between the accountant and Buyers. The court in the leading single case Reynolds said
that not being named in a retention agreement is not grounds to dismiss privity of

19

contract. Cases in many jurisdiction, including with a similar statute have never allowed
an accountant to conduct a due diligence meeting and withhold vital information.
There are numerous emails, reports, documents and other writings, which taken
together satisfy the writing requirement of the statute the accountant uses to ·disclaim
liability, which the leading case Reynolds said that such requirement is met when they all
impliedly point to the accountant, or there is a nexus between them.

Jury Instruction on concealment or nondisclosure fraud. The lower court ruled
against allowing the jury instruction here because one of the elements was a duty of the
accountant, which the court earlier dismissed. However, the court dismissed the
negligence claim because of the requirement of a statute shielding liability, and not
because of the merits of the claim. Concealment nondisclosure fraud is fraud,
notwithstanding it has the element of duty, and the statute allows fraud claims. Case law
~

clearly shows that the duty element here is met by the conduct of the accountant with
superior knowledge, upon which the buyer is heavily relying on, as the accountant knows.
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ARGUMENT

I. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS SHOULD HAVE A REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS SO THEY CAN PROVE THEIR FRAUD CLAIM
AGAINST A FALSIFIED EXCULPATORY AGREEMENT.
An exculpatory agreement should not prevent Plaintiffs-Appellants "the Balls"
from pursuing their fraud claim against their real estate broker Coldwell Banker
Commercial (CBC) and the broker's agent Duane Bush (Bush) in their purchase of a
business. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently mandated that an exculpatory
agreement never shields liability from fraud based on public policy.

In the case at bar, the business brokers CBC and Bush concealed from the Balls
essential company data that the Seller of the business, Steve May, gave to them. They
gave the Balls other falsified data which CBC and Bush knew to be false based on the
very data they kept from the Balls which verified the falsity of the falsified information
the brokers gave.
In court, CBC and Bush argued that the exculpatory agreement shields them from
such fraud because it states that the Balls agreed not to rely on the broker, but on the
Seller of the business. The agreement also states that the broker "has not verified" the
information. This falsified part of a fraudulent exculpatory "agreement" cannot shield the
fraud of Bush, and CBC who did verify that the data they gave to the Balls was false by
the very data they concealed. The Balls had no way of knowing that this kind of fraud
had been perpetrated on them when they signed an agreement. They had received
substantial information and business reports from the Seller through the broker. They
could not have imagined that the broker was concealing some of it.
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A. The Brokers' unpublished Ruf case. CBC cites an unpublished opinion from
this Court, Ruf, Inc. v. Icelandic Investments, Inc., 1999 WL 33244779 (Utah App. 1999)
for the proposition that the contract in the present case enables a business broker to
commit any and all the fraud he wants with absolute and total impunity, even against the
plain weight of the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court. This opinion is very brief and
therefore does not go into a serious analysis, and does not set forth the facts of the case in
any reasonable detail.
This case was directly overruled by the fully analyzed published opinion a year
later by this Court in Robinson v. Tripco Investment, Inc., 21 P.3d 219 (Utah App. 2000)
and by the Utah Supreme Court case Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235,241 (Utah 2002)
as will be set forth later, but Appellants give the following analysis of Ruf
notwithstanding.
The lower court was persuaded by this Ruf opinion, because of CBC and Bush's
argument that it would be impossible for the Balls to show the element of fraud--that of
"reasonable reliance" on the broker where the agreement said that the Balls would rely on
the information from the business owner rather than the broker.

In the case at bar, however, the Balls did place actual ~easonable reliance on the
fact that the company reports and information which came from the Seller through the
broker actually was coming through broker, and not being fraudulently filtered by the
broker.
The footnote in the Ruf case states that the provision "contractually defines roles."
But an essential part of the role of the Broker in the case at bar was to be the conduit of
the Seller information. The agreement said that "neither COLDWELL BANKER
COMMERCIAL nor any of its agents and/or employees have verified the representations
of the Seller... " Thus it was not the role of the broker to verify the information. This

22

does not at all contemplate that the broker would fraudulently filter the information so
that the reports which the broker knew were plainly false by reason of the reports and
documents they filtered out. Therefore, the Balls did reasonably rely on the broker being
an honest conduit of Seller information. The information that the broker fraudulently
filtered did indeed verify that the selected Seller information was patently false.
The roles are further clearly defined-that the Broker verified nothing, and
therefore knew nothing about the truth or falsity of their representations. The document
states in Paragraph 1:
Buyer further acknowledges that neither COLDWELL BANKER
COlv.11vlERCIAL nor any of its agents and/or employees have verified the.
representations of the Seller... "
Here, the document itself plainly represents that the broker has not verified the
representations of the Seller. This is plainly opposite from the broker having full
knowledge of the falsity of their representations--and then concealing the very data
which would verify the information the broker did disclose was false and fraudulent.
The Balls understood from the document that Bush and CBC did not investigate
nor know whether any representations were true, when in fact they plainly did know, and
maliciously misrepresented the same to the Balls. Balls had every reason to understand
and did understand that the terms of the Broker Acknowledgment document meant that
Defendants could not misrepresent that which they did not know. False representations
fully known by the Defendant Broker were not at all part of that document, according to
Balls' plain reasonable understanding. At the very least, the document is ambiguous to
the extent that Balls had no idea that the document would allow CBC or Bush to plainly
misrepresent that which they plainly knew to be true. See Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA,
48 P.3d 941 (Utah 2002) where the court said, "The underlying purpose in construing or
interpreting contractual provisions is to determine the intentions of the parties." It went
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on, "The court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions where the
contractual provision is ambiguous ... capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation ..."
Contracts are also construed against the drafter, especially a contract of adhesion
such as this afterthought document which the broker put in with the closing documents
after all of the broker services were already rendered. See United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company v. Sandt, 854 P .2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993) where the insured in an

adhesive insurance contract "is entitled to the broadest coverage he could reasonably
understand from the policy." No agreement where CBC could freely defraud was ever
entered into here.
The Ruf footnote further stated that the clause "identifies the source of any
representations." When the buyers were getting the Seller information they asked for
through the broker, they expected that any fraud would be on the part of the Seller if the
information were false. But they could never have contemplated that the broker was
filtering contradictory information out.
The Ruf footnote gave the added clause: "highlights the obligation of the buyer to
verify information." This is because the broker falsely represented that "neither
COLDWELL BANKER COivilvIBRCIAL nor any of its agents anµ/or employees have
verified the representations of the Seller... " But the very information which would have
verified that the representations were false were filtered by the broker--because the broker
saw it and knew that it would verify that the unfiltered information was falsified. The
broker did verify the information and fraudulently filtered it and concealed it.
Lastly, the Ruf footnote stated that the the clause "precludes reliance on any
@

representation made by broker." But the Balls were reasonably relying on the broker
being an honest conduit of the information which the Seller was providing. The Balls had
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no earthly reason to suspect otherwise. When the Balls needed to verify Seller
information, it was customary and proper for them to call the broker to get it from the
Seller, rather than to try to go to the Seller directly. To go to the Seller directly could be a
breach of the Seller's privacy which may alert employees of the Seller's business of an
uncontemplated sale. And the broker here was representing both the Seller and the Buyer
with a dual agency agreement--with a fiduciary duty to both--making the Balls' reliance
thatmuch more real and reasonable.
It should be noted that the Buyer in the Ruf case could not prove any damages even
against the Seller, much less the broker. Such weak facts are a further distinguishing
factor from the clear fraud in the case at bar.

It should be further noted that the Ruf broker had the buyer sign an exculpatory
agreement at the time in which the buyer was making an offer on a business--before due
diligence, not as an afterthought--at closing-after the Defendants had finished all of their
brokering duties, and after the Balls had performed all of their due diligence. The
signing of the exculpatory agreement after all duties were performed is the same as
signing a contract without consideration. The broker gave nothing for getting the Balls to
sign an exculpatory agreement, whereas if the signing took place at the outset before the
broker provided the services, then the broker's consideration of its services would be real.
B. The Published Robinson case. This Court in Robinson v. Tripco Investment,
Inc., 21 P.3d 219 (Utah App. 2000) analyzed another very similar case containing a
disclaimer for fraud provision. The disclaimer in the real estate purchase contract in that
case provided:
Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and
judgment and not by reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller
or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present
value, future value, income herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts

25

the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in
Section 6.

Id., p. 221.
The disclaimer provision here is nearly identical to both the Rufprovision and the
~

one in the case at bar. The situation here is the same: Any representation made to the
Buyer by the seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage .. .is purportedly not to be relied on.
The Court reversed summary judgment on a claim of fraud, even though Seller or

~

Broker's representations in that case were part of the disclaimer, and further,
notwithstanding even the merger doctrine which came into being with the conveyance of
a deed. The disclaimer here even went further to contain the "as is" property condition
clause.
This court gave the following analysis concerning the reasonable reliance of the
buyers:

1 20 To determine whether the reliance was reasonable, the reliance "must
be considered with reference to the facts of each case." Conder, 739 P.2d at
63 8. In general, a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact
without independent investigation. It is only where, under the
circumstances, the facts should make it apparent to one of his knowledge
and intelligence, or he has discovered something which should serve as a
warning that he is being deceived, that a plaintiff is required to make his
own investigation. Id. (citations omitted). In addition, "'[f]raud as related to
purchase of real estate may not be predicated on alleged false statements the
truth of which could have been ascertained with reasonable diligence by the
party asserting their falsity.'" Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc.,
875 P.2d 570, 577 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (citation omitted).

1 21 Applying the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case, we
cannot say as a matter of law that Cardiomed was unreasonable in its
reliance on Tripp's statements regarding the structural integrity of the
building ... Robinson questioned Tripp regarding some problems he observed
and Tripp responded that he had been involved in the construction and
engineering of the building, and that the building had no structural defects.
To support that claim, Tripp then provided Robinson with an inspection
report that failed to note any structural problems with the building. Simply
stated, because Tripp held himself out as someone with superior knowledge
of the building and then lent support to his representations by providing an
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inspection report, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
Cardiomed's reliance was reasonable.
Id., p. 224-225.
The Broker's unpublished Ruf case is simply trumped here by this court's more
recent published case a year later which simply overrules the unpublished ruling, making

Q

its new ruling in conformity with the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court discussed
below.

C. Utah Supreme Court Case Law. As state earlier, Utah case law prohibits

Q

contracts which work a fraud resulting from the contract.
In Kimball Elevator Co., Inc. V. Elevator Supplies Co., Inc., 272 P.2d 583,585
(Utah 1954), the Utah Supreme Court made it plain that a contract which would work a
fraud "would have been against public policy and void ... such a contract...would have
been a fraud ... and consequentially unenforceable."
This public policy is also true with clauses granting immunity, such as the case at
bar. In Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602,608 (Utah 1974) the Utah Supreme Court said:
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will protect a
person against his own fraud on the ground of public policy. A contract
limitation on damages or remedies is valid only in the absence of
allegations or proof of fraud.
See also Ong International v. 1 J'h Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447,453 (Utah 1993) where
the Court cites "Fraudulent inducement sufficient to nullify a contract ... can vitiate a
release. This is hombook law."

D. The Gilbert and Hermansen cases overrule Ruf. Case law also sets forth that
a duty exists on the part of a broker to be "h~nest, ethical and competent in dealing with
the buyer." Gilbert Development Corp. V. Wardley Corporation, 245 P.3d 131, 140
(Utah App. 2010). This duty is in fact "independent of any implied or express contracts."

Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235,241 (Utah 2002):
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"[t]hough not occupying a fiduciary relationship with prospective
purchasers, a real estate agent hired by the vendor is expected to be honest,
ethical, and competent and is answerable at law for his or her statutory duty
to the public." 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). We apply this reasoning
and hold that Terena as the real estate agent owed a duty, independent of
any implied or express contracts, to be "honest, ethical, and competent" in
her relationship with the Hermansens, although she and Tasulis were hired
by the vendor.
This duty of honesty, which cannot be contracted away even by an express valid
contract, would require CBC and Bush to be honest enough to disclose the plain falsity of
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their own false representations to The Ball, whom they did admit that they owed a
fiduciary duty after all. It would also require the broker to be competent enough to advise
The Balls regarding their need to obtain a contractor's license to purchase the company
they bought.
There can be no question that the Utah Supreme Court directly overruled Ruf in
the plainest language possible in Hermansen, 3 years after the unpublished Ru/ruling was
made. Yet the brokers here fail to mention it.

E. Plaintiffs had facts it can take to trial, notwithstanding the ruling on the
pleadings.
Had this ruling been Summary Judgment instead of Judgment on the Pleadings,
Balls had reasonable and substantial evidence to go to trial. Balls performed all
~

reasonable due diligence before closing, even having reports of profits shown to them by
the Sellers' Accountant, Defendants Bradshaw and his firm in a due diligence meeting.
Balls could not reasonably find out the falsity of the representations set forth in their
Complaint which was purposely withheld from them by Bush and CBC, including that the
2006 income was $74,703 instead of the $310,165 income Bush represented to them,
notwithstanding Balls' extensive due diligence of examining all company book data made
available to them at Seller's Accountant's office. Yet CBC and Bush knew, as seen from
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subsequent documents emailed from Bush to Balls in 2010 way after closing that Bush
had the full information showing the lower $74,703 profits for 2006 which he withheld
from them. See Fact No. 7 and 8. Bush had real reason to filter this document away from
the Balls' seeing it.
Balls could not have reasonably found out from their extensive due diligence that
the bread and butter account, Promontory, had filed for bankruptcy, yet CBC and Bush
fully knew and had documentation of the bankruptcy filings and even prior news reports
which they concealed.
Balls could neither likewise have found out from their reasonable due diligence
that there was serious commingling of funds between the Tile and the Granite company.
Balls specifically asked Bush whether there was commingling of funds, Bush made it
clear that there could not be any commingling between the company; otherwise Coldwell
Banker absolutely could not market the business in any degree. See Fact Nos. 17-18.
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However, CBC and Bush were fully apprised of all of these facts. They concealed a
specific email sent to Bush from the Seller's accountant Bradshaw which said, "Keep in
mind that there was a lot of intercompany commingling between Mays Tile and Mays
Granite." See Fact Nos. 19-20. This is an email that Bush really wanted filtered away
from the Balls.

II. BUYERS DO NOT NEED AN EXPERT WITNESS TO PROVE BROKER
FRAUD TO A JURY.

Bush admitted in plain deposition testimony that he had a fiduciary duty as a
broker to the Balls.
A. A jury is eminently qualified to determine whether a real estate agent that
defrauds his client has breached his admitted fiduciary duty. Juries have been called
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upon to determine fraud, a misrepresentation or other act of dishonesty without the
@

necessity of an expert to tell the jury whether such a thing has occurred.
Utah Statute has defined certain acts of real estate agents and brokers to be
"unlawful for a person licensed or required to be licensed... " Utah Code Ann.§ 61-2f401:
(l)(a) making a substantial misrepresentation; (b) making an
intentional misrepresentation; (c) pursuing a continued and flagrant course
of misrepresentation; ( d) making a false representation or promise through
an agent, sales agent, advertising, or otherwise; or ( e) making a false
representation or promise of a character likely to influence, persuade, or
induce ...
( 14) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to the licensee's
principal in a real estate transaction;
·
( 15) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing.
No expert is necessary to show any reasonable jury concerning any of these acts of
dishonesty which are plainly defined by the above statute as unlawful for real estate
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agents, regardless whether any fiduciary duty even exists. Surely a fiduciary who so acts
unlawfully against his principal has breached a fiduciary duty to his principal which is
within the scope of a reasonable jury to determine without expert testimony.
Bush and CBC argue that they did not need a real estate license to sell businesses.
However, the statute states that the acts are unlawful "for a person licensed or required to
be licensed," indicating that since Bush was licensed as a real estate sales agent, the
statute applies to him whether the license was required or not. CBC even advertises on its
website that it consists of "commercial real estate professionals." (Rec. 1248) In addition,
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-2f-201(2) states that a real estate sales license is needed "to buy,
sell, lease, manage, or exchange real estate." The Tile business Bush and CBC sold to
The Balls leased a warehouse to do business in, which therefore involved the sale of a
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real estate lease with the sale of the business, and therefore a real estate license is required
here.
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B. Case Law sets forth that a jury is well suited to determine the issues before
it in this case without any expert testimony. Bush and CBC cite Preston & Chambers
v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260,263 (Utah App. 1997) for the proposition that expert testimony is
required where the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by
particular trades or professions. CBC cites as "dispositive" the case, Posner v. Equity

Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 222.p.3d 775, (Utah App. 2009). While it is true that the
performance of medical doctors and engineers would obviously need expert testimony for
what the standard of care is in a negligence action, This is not applicable or apposite in
the present case at all.
In Posner, a real estate broker was sued for negligence and breach of fiduciary

G

duty concerning what the broker should have done with respect to complex issues
involving "partial seller financing, the requirement of a surety bond, Posner's out-of-state
residence, and the split closing dates" of the particular "complex transaction." Id., p. 782,
par. 22.

Posner itself also cites two cases, Reese v. Harper 329 P.2d 410 (1958) and
Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983) where no expert was
needed to prove breaches of duty by a real estate agent:
Posner cites Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1958), for the
proposition that a real estate agent breaches duties of care and disclosure
when the agent " fail[ s] to inform and explain to the seller fully of all the
facts material to the transaction." The facts of Reese differ significantly
from the present facts. Namely, Reese hinged on the fact that Reese had
been employed by Harper to sell his real estate for $45,000, approximately
$15,000 of which would pay off encumbrances on the property, leaving
Harper with a net profit of $30,000. See id. at 411. Reese presented Harper
with an offer of $30,000 that appeared to have the buyer pay off the
encumbrances, but which actually had Harper pay them off, thus bringing
Harper's net sale total to approximately $15,000. See id. at 411-12. Because
Reese failed to disclose this fact--a fact that decreased Harper's price by
roughly half--the Reese court affirmed the jury's determination that Reese
had breached a fiduciary duty to Harper. See id. at 413. Posner also draws
on Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), which
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refers to the duties of a real estate agent to his principal. As with Reese, thefacts in Phillips are not as complex as in this case and neither of the cases
address the issue of when an expert witness is required.

Posner, fn 7.
The .present case is obviously likewise very distinguishable from the facts of

Posner and are fully in line with Reese and Phillips, where Bush and CBC by its agent
Bush made egregious misrepresentations which are clearly false from the evidence.
Unlike Posner where the broker's principal could not point to any administrative rules
identifying what constitutes a falling below a standard of care for a broker, The Balls here
clearly sets forth the Utah Statute above identifying as unlawful substantial or intentional
misrepresentations, a flagrant course of misrepresentations, especially which may be
likely to influence or induce the principal's action, or even any dishonest dealing. Such
actions are unlawful for a broker against anyone, much less for a broker who owed a
~

fiduciary duty to the person he is defrauding. There is nothing at all too "complex" for a
jury to understand about fraud and dishonesty. False representations, fraud and
d~shonesty are unquestionably "within the common knowledge and experience of the
layperson" which Posner itself states as expert testimony being unnecessary. Id., par. 22
at p. 782.
Balls have argued above that Utah law does not allow a real estate agent or broker
to exculpate himself by an exculpatory agreement from the fraudulent conduct which that
agent then perpetrates. If this court were to determine that Bush and CBC's exculpatory
agreement prevails against the Balls' fraud claims against them, then surely such
egregious fraud, dishonesty and unlawful acts which a jury will surely find here, cannot
now be seriously argued in good faith as being beyond the jury's comprehension.
Case law states that fraud, fraudulent nondisclosure have the same elements, which
elements are within the grasp of a jury without an expert witness. In Gilbert
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Development Corp. V. Wardley Corporation, 245 P.3d 131, 139 (Utah App. 2010), the
court held that there are three elements of breach of fiduciary duty: ( 1) a fiduciary duty to
disclose material information, (2) knowledge of the information, and (3) failure to
disclose the information. See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52 par.18-22, 48 P.3d 235,
241 (Utah 2002) This court went on to note: "where a verdict (meaning by a jury) has
been entered against GDC on its breach of fiduciary duty claim, its claim for fraudulent
nondisclosure based on proving the same elements at a higher standard of proof must
Q

also-and necessarily-fail." This Court here is saying that the elements of nondisclosure
fraud are the very same elements of breach of fiduciary duty in the case, but with the
higher standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence. Hence a jury is well suited to
find breach of fiduciary duty just as it can find fraudulent nondisclosure.
In Hermansen, if you cannot prove breach of fiduciary duty, then you cannot prove
the same elements constituting fraud with the higher clear and convincing standard of
proof. Similarly in the present case, where the Balls can prove fraud--but was prevented
from doing so by the trial court by reason of an exculpatory agreement, the Balls can then
just as easily prove breach of fiduciary duty by proving the same elements of fraud or
fraudulent nondisclosure with the lower standard of proof. Hence there can be no
argument that proving fiduciary duty is not any more complex than proving fraud.
The brokers never have alleged that the Balls would need an expert to prove their
fraud. Therefore, there is no sense in the brokers' argument that the Balls need an expert
to prove the same elements of fraud with a lesser standard of proof. A jury is well
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qualified to determine whether fraud exists or whether it does not as a breach of fiduciary
duty
Appellants cannot fathom how the trial court would rule that fraud or nondisclosure fraud necessitates an expert witness. There was significant analysis in the
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Gilbert case about jury instructions in the 7 day jury trial in that case concerning real
\ii?

estate agents, without a single mention of an expert witness, especially on the details of
the breach of duty, and that which the jury was instructed regarding what disclosures
were material. Id., p. 142-144. The jury was also sufficiently instructed on the elements
of breach of fiduciary duty. Id., p. 144. No mention of expert testimony exists in the
entire case.
Similarly, in the case at bar, a jury is eminently competent to decide whether the
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cash sales income for a key year was $74,000.00 and not the falsely represented
$310,000.00 is a material fact in-the Balls' decision to buy the company. It is further well
within the purview of a jury to decide whether the nondisclosure and false representation
concerning the stoppage of 40% of the ongoing sales income of the Tile business is
material to a buyer of the company. When the broker makes it crystal clear that there
cannot be any commingling between the Tile company they were marketing to the Balls,
and the Granite company also owned by the Seller, it is way within the understanding of a
jury to decide nondisclosure and false representation, when the broker knew that there
~

was serious commingling. Lastly, when a broker lists and sells many commercial
businesses which require state licensing, a duty to disclose to the Balls concerning what
state license would be required when asked by the Balls, is a basic duty to tell the truth a
jury can clearly understand.
At the Court hearing, the Court was persuaded by the Broker's counsel's argument
regarding the "immense complexity" of the brokering of a business. As a result, the
Court inexplicably ruled that an expert witness was necessary "to establish a standard of
care" (Rec. 1824 p. 68) or "what particular duties and responsibilities a business broker
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would owe in connection with transmitting information to a prospective buyer." (Rec.
1824 p. 69) This ruling completely overlooks the plain fraudulent misrepresentations
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made by the broker, which fraud is without question an issue a jury can decide. A blatant
misrepresentation of net income to be less than 1/4 of what it actually is, is fraud, plain
and simple, and not some esoteric complexity to compare with a doctor's duty of care.
And DBD and Bush has never alleged that fraud can only be proven by an expert
witness.

III. PLAINTIFFS HAD PRIVITY OF CONTRACT WITH BRADSHAWS IN THE
DUE DILIGENCE MEETING, AS MAYS, BRADSHAWS AND THE BALLS ALL
AGREED THAT THE BALLS WOULD BE THE DIRECT THIRD PARTY
BENEFICIARIES OF THE DUE DILIGENCE SERVICES OF BRADSHAWS.
Bradshaws cite Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-26a-602 as a statute which lets Bradshaws
off the hook for the accounting attestation services they gave to The Balls. This statute
states:
A licensee, a CPA firm registered under this chapter, and any employee,
partner, member, officer, or shareholder of a licensee or CPA firm are not
liable to persons with whom they are not in privity of contract for civil
damages resulting from acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct in
connection with professional services performed by that person, except for:
(1) acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitute fraud or
intentional misrepresentations; or
(2) other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct, if the person
performing the professional services:
(a) knew that a primary intent of the client was for the
professional services to benefit or influence the particular
person seeking to establish liability; and
(b) identified in writing to the client that the professional
services performed on behalf of the client were intended to be
relied upon by the particular person seeking to establish
liability.
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Bradshaws allege that Balls were not in privity of contract with the Balls, and second,
there was no writing wherein Bradshaws "identified in writing to the client an intent that
the plaintiff rely." This statute does not bar The Balls' recovery in this case.
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A. Balls were in full privity of contract with Bradshaws as a third party
~

beneficiary. Reynolds v. Bickel, 307 P.3d 570 (Utah 2013) is the Utah case which
interprets the above statute and is also that which Bradshaws rely on. In that case, the
Court indicated that the third party "Mr. Reynolds conceded that he is not in privity with
Defendants [accountants]." Id., p. 572. The case noted in the footnote [2] the following:
Had Mr. Reynolds not made this concession, we would consider whether
the actions of Mr. Reynolds and Defendants amounted to a relationship of
accountant and client notwithstanding the fact that the retention agreement
did not name Mr. Reynolds as a client.
This statement from the Court amounts to a statement that the Court would
consider whether an accountant client relationship existed even though the retention
agreement did not name the client directly.
At the time in which the Balls were making an offer to Steven May to purchase
May's Tile, the Balls entered into a contingency provision where the sale was contingent
upon "Seller proving to Buyer's satisfaction the financial information for subject
business." (Rec. 1189) The Balls then requested to see the books, whereupon Mr. May
said that the books contained extremely sensitive information, and that he could not give
the Balls the books. Then, an agreement was reached between the Balls and Mr. May,
wherein Mr. May would hire and pay for his accountant Bradshaws to provide the
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accounting and attestation services in a due diligence meeting, and where the Balls would
ask due diligence questions to Bradshaws and get answers from him "to their
satisfaction."
The Balls' Expert Witness Accountant Brandon Ball testified in deposition that
Bradshaws' services fell in the realm of accountant services ... and therefore, created a
relationship, accountant-client relationship, between Mr. Bradshaw and Reperex and Mr.
Ball. (Rec. 1141)
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This agreement wherein Mr. May would provide the company accountant was an
agreement where the Balls would be the third party beneficiary of Bradshaws which Mr.
May bought and paid for. Bradshaws fully understood that this was a due diligence
meeting where the Balls were investigating the books prior to buying the company. Mr.
Bradshaw was asked, "Were you asked to do any help for the prospective sale to the
Balls?" Bradshaw answered: "Yes." Mr. Bradshaw then described what help that was in
detail, which included showing to the Balls numerous documents, tax returns and reports,
including ones he extracted from the quickbooks files. (Rec. 1170-1173)
Hence the Balls were the client of Bradshaws for that due diligence hearing, which
Mays bought and paid for as agreed. Neither Steve May nor his company received any
service from that due diligence meeting. The Balls would never have purchased the
company without the help, attestation and answers to their questions from Bradshaw,
upon which they could rely from the accountant's services as agreed by all, and for which
May paid for in behalf of the Balls so that the Balls could have "Seller proving to Buyer's
satisfaction the financial information for subject business." Hence, the Balls were in full
privity of contract with the Bradshaws, the same as an insurance company would owe
insurance to a third party contract beneficiary who is an insured.
Lastly, there are a number of courts which has analyzed a "near-privity" approach
in holding accountants liable in situations where they should clearly be held liable. In

lvfl--Lee Acquisition Fund, L.P. v. DeLoitte & Touche, 463 S.E.2d 618,625 (S.C.App.
1995) the court analyzed case law in several jurisdictions regarding the issue of "near
privity of contract" as follows:
The scope of a public accountant's duty to third persons who use and rely
on their reports is an issue of first impression in South Carolina. However,
in the states considering the issue, three main approaches have developed.
The most restrictive approach, requiring strict contractual privity before
liability could be imposed, was first enunciated by Chief Judge Cardozo of
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the New York Court of Appeals in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven &
Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441,446 (1931). The Ultramares strict privity
standard was relaxed somewhat by the court in Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536,493 N.Y.S.2d 435,483 N.E.2d 110
(N.Y.1985) to extend recovery to third parties enjoying a relationship to the
accountant that "sufficiently approaches privity." Thus, under New York's
"near privity" approach, accountants may be liable to third parties only if
( 1) the accountants actually know their reports will be used for a particular
purpose; (2) the accountants know that a nonclient is expected to rely on
the reports in furtherance of a particular purpose; and (3) there has been
some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that party or
parties, which evinces the accountant's understanding of that party's or
parties' reliance. Id. Several states follow New York's "near privity"
approach. See, e.g., Colonial Bank ofAlabama v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551
So.2d 390 (Ala.1989); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp ofIdaho,
115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989); Thayer v. Hicks, 243 Mont. 138, 793
P.2d 784 (1990) (adopting modified version of near-privity approach).
The Utah statute which the accountant here wants to shield himself from liability,
should not be construed so narrowly to not include a sufficient closeness to privity to
make a person liable where an accountant should be liable, as in the present case where
I@

the Balls had nobody else to offer due diligence services, where the accountant agreed to
provide the attestation services in a due diligence meeting where he knew that the only
purpose of the meeting was to provide such due diligence services to the Balls.
The Supreme Court said that "it would consider what would amount to a
relationship of accountant and client notwithstanding the fact that an agreement did not
name him as a client." Reynolds, p. 572, fn 2.

B. Bradshaws fully identified in writing that Bradshaws were giving
information upon which Bush and his prospects would rely. Bradshaws cite Reynolds
v. Bickel, 307 p.3d 570 (Utah 2013) to attempt to show that there was no writing where
Bradshaw "agreed" to provide accounting services. However, Bradshaw fulfilled the
writing requirement by "identifying in writing" an intent that the the Balls rely. The
@

Court in Reynolds said:

38

[the statute] does not require an -explicit statement in a single writing; it
requires an "identification in writing" that a third party is intended to rely
on the accountant's services ...
Additionally, all of the e-mails and spreadsheets ...manifest an" implied
reference" to one another, based on the contents of the writings and the
circumstances surrounding the transaction ... The common theme of the
email and spreadsheets ...reflect what.was the purpose of their retention.

Id., p. 574-575.
Similarly, the emails and documents sent by Bradshaw to Bush for his prospects
show that Bradshaw's professional services were intended to be relied upon by Bush and
his prospects, and the Balls.
In the case at bar, Bradshaw's numerous written responses to questions also show
that he was giving accounting advice and that he intended to give the accounting advice.
These writings serve the full purpose of the writing portion of Utah Code Ann. section
58-26a-602 which requires the accountant "identifiy] in writing to the client an intent that
the client rely on the same.
In addition, Mr. Bradshaw has acknowledged in writing in emails that he was
providing help to May's business broker Duane Bush for Bush's prospective buyers of the
company, including emails dated February 20, 2008, February 21, 2008, February 22,
2008, March 12, 2008 5 emails on March 13, 2008, and an email on March 27, 2008.
(Rec. 1118-113 8) Bradshaw provided Bush information, documents and reports needed
for Bush's prospect "to commence his due diligence review." (Rec. 1128) In a March 25
email, Bush states, "I have spoken with Steve [May] and he said this would be best
coming from you [Bradshaw]." (Rec. 1119) Bush then asks for month by months profit
and loss reports because "the bank is requesting this. They want to see why the 36%
revenue drop from 06 v. 07." Bradshaw responds with a detailed explanation to Bush and
his buyers about details of the company, including a statement that the "expenses are a bit
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shakey" and "there was a lot of intercompany commingling between Mays Tile and Mays
'JJ

Granite."

(Rec. 1118)

Bradshaw also admits in deposition that the advice to Bush's pr~spects was
ongoing, where he responded to the question "Were you asked to do any help for the
prospective sale to the Balls? Bradshaw answered "Yes. I was asked to provide similar
documents to -- to Duane Bush as we had before. Many of them were the same
documents. Nothing changed." (Rec.1170, lines 7-20) Here Bradshaw admits that all of
the information given in emails to Bush applied to the Balls as a prospective purchaser.
Bradshaw then produced the written documents to the Balls.
Balls testified at trial and Bradshaw directly admitted that the Balls came on
August 11, 2008 to a due diligence meeting. (Rec 1827 at page 79, lines 16-20).
Bradshaw issued a written billing to May for the due diligence meeting for which the
Balls were the contract beneficiary. Bradshaw admitted in deposition issuing such a
billing--writing in his 2012 deposition at p. 115, line 24 top. 116 line 9.
There was a communication, obviously an email since deleted and not produced,
sent between Bush, May and Bradshaw to set up the due diligence meeting. (Rec. 1826-Trial testimony at p. 51, 12-9.)
At that due diligence meeting, Bradshaw produced several written reports,
including profit and loss statements to the Balls. (Rec 1827 at page 83 line 18 top. 84,
line 23.)
In a written fax from May to Bradshaw, a report showing credits which Balls
inquired about in the due diligence meeting were sent to Bradshaw immediately after that
due diligence meeting, about the credits the Balls specifically inquired about, which had
~

bad debt entries entered on them, including one for the amount the Balls inquired about at
the meeting. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 66, p. 5 of fax) This document had a writing on it
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showing "See me, Russ" and specific written markings on the report setting forth the bad
debt. This particular document was an integral part of the inquiries of the Balls at the due
diligence meeting where they asked about a $130, 000.00 credit, and which Bradshaw
remembered that the Balls asked about at the meeting. This document served as a keen
reminder to Bradshaw, wherein he gave testimony in depth about the credit memos the

G

Balls inquired about, and after which he investigated himself what the credit memos
were, including the specific $129,008.10 entry. Bradshaw remembered entering about
$236,000 in bad debt expense 3 days later Rec 1827 at page 46, line 12-14, and Plaintiffs
Exhibit 66, which bad debt entries was kept back from the Balls--all from this document.
It should be noted that this last Exhibit 66 document was not produced by
Bradshaw in discovery in direct contravention to 5 discovery requests for the same, and
was only discovered after further hearings where Bradshaw was caught keeping back
documents. (Rec 1568-1569) There may be other writings which may exist and may be
still kept back by Bradshaw's flagrant disobedience to many of Balls' discovery requests
for them.
All of these documents were produced regarding Bradshaw's involvement with the
Balls' investigation into the company and also concerning the August 11, 2008 due
diligence meeting.
Later in discovery, the Balls obtained copies of the quickbooks files which
Bradshaw maintained in his office and from which he would have obtained his due
diligence reports. (Rec. 122)
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All of these writings show that Bradshaw was directly involved with the Balls, and
further that he was the accountant which the Balls went to to conduct their due diligence
meeting. They all together show that the Balls expected to rely on Bradshaw for his
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attestation services at the due diligence meeting. and that Bradshaw knew that this was a
~

due diligence meeting for which the Balls would rely on as a due diligence meeting.
In Reynolds, the Court said, "we hold that for purposes of Section 602(2)(b), one
or more writings, not all of which are authored by the party to be charged, may be

~

considered together as a memorandum if there is a nexus between them." Id., p. 574.
That is true for all of these emails and documents, including the written documents given
at the due diligence meeting. These in connection with Bradshaw's sworn testimony that
he knew that it was a due diligence meeting should suffice. (Rec 1827 at page 79, lines
16-20) Bradshaw also confirmed that all of the written documents and emails sent to
Bush applied to the Balls as well as Bush's former prospect. (Rec.1170, lines 7-20)
In Reynolds, the Court further analyzed:
The common theme of the e-mail and spreadsheets are the tax implications for Mr.
Reynolds of the sale of the Altaview Companies. Indeed, these writings all reflect
what Defendants have admitted was the purpose of their retention: to minimize
Mr. Reynolds's personal tax liability from the sale of the Altaview Companies.

Mr. Reynolds was the only person or entity who could benefit from Mr.
Bickel's advice ...he was impliedly communicating " that [his] professional
services ... were intended to be relied upon by" Mr. Reynolds.

Id., p. 575.
Similarly, the Balls fully relied on Mr. Bradshaw in the only due diligence meeting
@

where the Balls could get the information they need to verify the information about the
company they were buying. The due diligence meeting was intended solely for the Balls'
benefit. The data and reports which Bradshaw gave to the Balls was specifically for that

(@

sole purpose. Nobody else benefitted. The writings all similarly impliedly communicated
this purpose.
There are similar cases to the one at bar in Illinois with facts not so egregiously
pointing to the accountant's liability, and where Illinois has a statute very similar to the
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Utah statute limiting liability. In Chestnut Corp. v. Pestine, Brinati, Gamer, LTD, 667
N.E.2d 544 (Ill App. 1996) the court recognized that unless accountants agree in writing
to expose themselves to liability, they could never be held to be liable in any real
situations where they should be to people they know are relying on them. In that case,
investors visited the accountant's office and were given financial statements they were
told were accurate. In so doing, that court liberally interpreted the writing requirement.
Similarly here, where there are many writings which impliedly communicate that the
Balls were relying on Bradshaw for attestation services in a due diligence meeting, those
writings should be given a liberal·interpretation.
This is not a situation where an accountant is being held liable to third parties
which they must "seek out...for an indeterminate period of time after their work is
prepared ... " Builders Bank v. Barry Finkel and Associates, 790 N.E.2d 30, 37 (Ill. App.
2003). It is when the "primary intent" or the "purpose and intent...was to benefit or
influence the third-party." Id., p. 36. "To be sufficient Plaintiffs' complaint must allege
facts showing that the purpose and intent... was to benefit or influence the third-party
plaintiff." Clarkv. Feder Semo and Bard, P.C., 634 F.Supp.2d 99, 108 (D.D.C. 2009)
In summary, liability should unquestionably accrue to an accountant who provides
attestation services in a due diligence meeting where the accountant knows that the
Plaintiffs are relying on the accountant's information as the only source of due diligence
verification, and where the only purpose of such a meeting is for due diligence. The Utah
Statute cannot have been intended to shield accountants so that they can do unjustifiable
harm with impunity. It must have the same intent as the statutes and case law of most
jurisdictions.
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IV. HE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED WITH THE MUJI JURY
INSTRUCTION REGARDING NONDISCLOSURE FRAUD.
Appellants the Balls requested the Court to have the jury instructed with that
Instruction No. CV181 l on Fraudulent Nondisclosure, of the Model Utah Jury
@

Instructions Second Edition (MUJI 2d), and the trial court denied their oral motion to
include the instruction, in a hearing on the last day of trial before the jury was to be
instructed.
The instruction is as follows:
CVl 811 Concealment or fraudulent non-disclosure.
I have determined that [name of plaintiff] was in a [type of relationship]
that gave [name of defendant] a duty to disclose an important fact to [name
of plaintiff]. You must decide whether [name of defendant] failed to
disclose an important fact. To establish that [name of defendant] failed to
disclose an important fact, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the
following:
(1) that [name of defendant] knew [describe the important fact] and failed to
disclose it to [name of plaintiff];

(2) that [name of plaintiff] did not know [describe the important fact]; and
(3) that [name of defendant]'s failure to disclose [describe the important
fact] was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiffj's damages.
References
Anderson v. Kriser, 2011 UT 66.
Gilbert Development Corp., v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361.
Yazd v. Woodside, 143 P.3d 283 (Utah 2006).
Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 561 (Utah App. 2007).
Committee Notes
This instruction should be given only if the Court has determined that a
special relationship imposing the higher duty is established as a matter of
law. Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 561 (Utah App. 2007).
.
MUJI 2d, CV181 l.
The court gave as reasons for denying the instruction the fact that the Court had
already dismissed the negligence claim on summary judgment, therefore, on the duty
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requirement of the fraudulent nondisclosure element, "effectively I've determined there
was no duty ... and in dismissing the negligence claim, ... there was not a special
relationship. (Rec. 1828, p. I I line 1 top 12 16, p.22 line 17 top. 23 line 6)
The Court further indicated that it understood that the accountant owed a duty of
confidentiality to the first client--May's Custom Tile and Mr. May, and if the accountant
Bradshaw were to "now have a duty, a potentially conflicting duty to speak up, even in
violation of a confidentiality obligation ... " then a duty to disclose to the Balls as buyers in
the due diligence meeting would appear to further jeopardize his duty to his first client.
(Rec. 1828, p 9 line 6-22)
In using this analysis, the Court rejected the stock MUJI instruction on fraudulent
nondisclosure without a serious analysis on what the cases supporting that stock
instruction indicated concerning what constitutes a "special relationship" which would
impose the higher duty element of fraudulent nondisclosure.
The court further indicated that it had already rejected the element of duty when it
granted summary judgment in favor of the accountant on the n~gligence claim. The court
did not take into account that it dismissed the negligence claim by reason of the statute
Utah Code Ann. § 58-26a-602 shielding accountants from liability as discussed above.
Instead, the Court analyzed that it had earlier found no duty to exist. In fact the
fraudulent nondisclosure instruction is fraud, and not negligence, and the statute excepts
fraud-accountants are liable for fraud notwithstanding the statute. Hence, fraudulent
nondisclosure, which must be proven with clear and convincing evidence, is excepted
from the summary judgment dismissal under that statute. Therefore, when duty is an
element of fraud as it is here, it survives the dismissal the Court thought that it gave under
that statute.
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A. Duty which grows out of a relationship. In Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562,
572 (Utah App. 2007), this court said:
A relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely to be accompanied by a
duty than one, for example, in which parties are in privity of contract. Age,
knowledge, influence, bargaining power, sophistication, and cognitive
ability are but the more prominent among a multitude of life circumstances
that a court may consider in analyzing whether a legal duty is owed by one
party to another. Where a disparity in one or more of these circumstances
distorts the balance between the parties in a relationship to the degree that
one party is exposed to unreasonable risk, the law may intervene by
creating a duty on the advantaged party to conduct itself in a manner that
does not reward exploitation of its advantage.
Here, this Court gave a a full spectrum of analysis-"a multitude of life
circumstances" on what may constitute a duty. This duty is also "strictly a question of
\;j

law" and therefore a trial judge has no discretion on its determination. Id.
In the case at bar, the Balls were wholly dependent on Bradshaw for truthful due
diligence information. The Balls were depending on the knowledge, influence,
sophistication and cognitive ability of the May's Tile Company accountant as having
superior knowledge, plus Bradshaw's knowledge that the Balls, who knew nothing of the
truth of the company, and who were entirely dependent on the company's accountant to
give truthful information. The disparity in all of these circumstances was profound in
every respect. The parties agreed that the due diligence the Balls would be allowed to do
was to review the books with the company accountant. And the accountant admitted at
trial that he knew that this was a due diligence meeting. (Rec. 1827, p 79, line 18)
Without the accountant having a duty to tell the truth, this simply would not have
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been a due diligence meeting, but a fraud, masquerading as a due diligence meeting. The
relationship which Moore describes is unquestionably present. Moore was about a
general contractor who was found to owe a duty to a buyer. "The communication of
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material information to [the home buyers] is one of the obligations that flow from [the
builder-contractor's] assumption of its legal duty." Id., p. 573
In Yazd v. Woodside Homes, 143 P .3d 283, 287 (Utah 2006) it was a homebuilder's
"status as builder-contractor that gives rise to its legal duty to the home buyers." in
another fraudulent nondisclosure case cited as a reference to the MUJI instruction. In

Anderson v. Kriser, 266 P.3d 819, 826-827 (Utah 2011), the Supreme Court held that a
developer can be liable to a buyer who hires his own builder.
It was more egregious for Bradshaw to hide vital information in what he knew to
be a due diligence meeting with the buyers than the facts are in Yazd and Anderson.
Bradshaw said at trial that he would get back to the Balls about a $130,000.00 credit
inquiry right in the due diligence meeting, and then did not, but yet Bradshaw entered
$236,000.00 in bad debt on the company books 3 days after the due diligence meeting
which included that very $130,000.00 inquiry which he knew was not merely some
irrelevant adjustment, but actual bad debt the Balls knew nothing about. See Fact nos. 58,
59, 60. It should be noted that both of the above cases concerned the purchase of
property.
In the present case, the trial court seemed to say that the duty of confidentiality to
his business client seemed to trump any duty to the Balls in the due diligence meeting.
However, in Gilbert Development Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 246 P.3d 131, 140 (Utah App.
2010), this Court said that "a seller's real estate agent must "be honest, ethical, and
competent" in dealing with the buyer." This imposes a duty on the real estate agent who
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similarly has confidential duties owed to his client to disclose to the buyer "so that the
buyer has sufficient accurate information to make an informed decision." Again, in the
case at bar, Bradshaw knew that the Balls were relying on him to give sufficient accurate
information, and therefore he had a clear duty to do so.
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The trial court also was concerned about whether such a duty should be imposed
on professionals such as accountants. A real estate agent as in Gilbert surely was a
professional. In other jurisdictions accountants have been held liable for omissions as
well as misrepresentations. See Newby v. Enron v. Lay, 235 F.Supp. 2d 549{S.D.Tex
2002) where a lawyer, accountant or bank makes a material misstatement (or omission) is
liable; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Goldstone, Simmons and Starrett, 952
F.Supp. 2d 1060, 1089, 1091 (D.N.M.2013) where a mortgage company's chief
accounting officers were responsible for their "knowing or being reckless in not knowing"
facts that they col)cealed.
In this due diligence meeting with the Balls, Bradshaw cannot argue that he had
such a duty of confidentiality to Steve May and May's Custom Tile so as to lie and/or to
conceal important material vital information from the Balls in their due diligence at his
~

office which he agreed to do. If his conflict of interest were so great, he would
necessarily have had to recuse himself.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs--Appellants the Balls have not been able to have their day in court by
reason of the dismissal of their fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims against the real
estate broker Coldwell Banker Commercial and its real estate agent Duane Bush. The
Balls also have been stopped from having their day in court against the accounting firm
Child Van Wagoner and Bradshaw and its accountant J. Russton Bradshaw on their
claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The Balls have further not had the
jury properly instructed on concealment fraud from the MUJI 2d. The Balls request to
have their day in court on their claims of Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Negligent
Misrepresentation against Bradshaw and his firm, on both of their claims of Fraud and
Breach of Fiduciary Duty against Coldwell Banker and Bush, and where the jury is
instructed on concealment nondisclosure fraud against Bradshaw.
Dated this August 21, 2015
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ADDENDUM

58-26a-602. Privity.
A licensee, a CPA firm registered under this chapter, and any employee, partner,
member, officer, or shareholder of a licensee or CPA firm are not liable to persons with
whom they are not in privity of contract for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions,
decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services performed by that
person, except for:
( 1)
acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitute fraud or intentional
misrepresentations; or
(2)
other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct, if the person performing the
professional services:
(a)
knew that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit
or influence the particular person seeking to establish liability; and
(b)
identified in writing to the client that the professional services performed on behalf
of the client were intended to be relied upon by the particular person seeking to establish
liability.

61-2f-401. Grounds for disciplinary action.
The following acts are unlawful for a person licensed or required to be licensed under
this chapter:
(1)
(a)
making a substantial misrepresentation;
(b)
making an intentional misrepresentation;
( c)
pursuing a continued and flagrant course of misrepresentation;
(d)
making a false representation or promise through an agent, sales agent, advertising,
or otherwise; or
(e)
making a false representation or promise of a character likely to influence,
persuade, or induce;
(2)
acting for more than one party in a transaction without the informed consent of the
parties;
(3)
(a)
acting as an associate broker or sales agent while not affiliated with a principal
broker;
(b)
representing or attempting to represent a principal broker other than the principal
broker with whom the person is affiliated; or
( c)
representing as sales agent or having a contractual relationship similar to that of
sales agent with a person other than a principal broker;
(4)
(a)
failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit money that belongs to
another and comes into the person's possession;
(b)
commingling money described in Subsection (4)(a) with the person's own money;
or
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(c)
diverting money described in Subsection (4)(a) from the purpose for which the
money is received;
(5)
paying or offering to pay valuable consideration, as defined by the commission, to
a person not licensed under this chapter, except that valuable consideration may be
shared:
(a)
with a principal broker of another jurisdiction; or
(b)
as provided under:
(i)
Title 16, Chapter 10a, Utah Revised Business Corporation Act;
(ii)
Title 16, Chapter 11, Professional Corporation Act; or
(iii) Title 48, Chapter 2c, Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act, or Title 48,
Chapter 3a, Utah Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, as appropriate
pursuant to Section 48-3a-1405;
(6)
for a principal broker, paying or offering to pay a sales agent or associate broker
who is not affiliated with the principal broker at the time the sales agent or associate
broker earned the compensation;
(7)
being incompetent to act as a principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent in
such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public;
(8)
failing to voluntarily furnish a copy of a document to the parties before and after
the execution of a document;
(9)
failing to keep and make available for inspection by the division a record of each
transaction, including:
(a)
the names of buyers and sellers or lessees and lessors;
(b)
the identification of real estate;
(c)
the sale or rental price;
(d)
money received in trust;
(e)
agreements or instructions from buyers and sellers or lessees and lessors; and
(t)
any other information~required by rule;
(10) failing to disclose, in writing, in the purchase, sale, or rental of real estate, whether
the purchase, sale, or rental is made for that person or for an undisclosed principal;
(11) being convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude within five years
of the most recent application:
(a)
regardless of whether the criminal offense is related to real estate; and
(b)
including:
(i)
a conviction based upon a plea of nolo contendere; or
(ii)
a plea held in abeyance to a criminal offense involving moral turpitude;
(12) advertising the availability of real estate or the services of a licensee in a false,
misleading, or deceptive manner;
(13) in the case of a principal broker or a licensee who is a branch manager, failing to
exercise reasonable supervision over the activities of the principal broker's or branch
manager's licensed or unlicensed staff;
(14) violating or disregarding:
(a)
this chapter;
(b)
an order of the commission; or
(c)
the rules adopted by the commission and the division;
(15) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to the licensee's principal in a real
estate transaction;
( 16) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing;
( 17) unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or rule;
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( 18) having one of the following suspended, revoked, surrendered, or cancelled on the
basis of misconduct in a professional capacity that relates to character, honesty, integrity,
or truthfulness:
(a)
a real estate license, registration, or certificate issued by another jurisdiction; or
(b)
another license, registration, or certificate to engage in an occupation or profession
issued by this state or another jurisdiction;
(19) failing to respond to a request by the division in an investigation authorized under
this chapter, including:
(a)
failing to respond to a subpoena;
(b)
withholding evidence; or
(c)
failing to produce documents or records;
(20) in the case of a dual licensed title licensee as defined in Section 3 lA-2-402:
(a)
providing a title insurance product or service without the approval required by
Section 3 lA-2-405; or
(b)
knowingly providing false or misleading information in the statement required by
Subsection 3 lA-2-405(2);
(21) violating an independent contractor agreement between a principal broker and a
sales agent or associate broker as evidenced by a final judgment of a court;
(22)
(a)
engaging in an act of loan modification assistance that requires Ii censure as a
mortgage officer under Chapter 2c, Utah Residential Mortgage Practices and Licensing
Act, without being licensed under that chapter;
(b)
engaging in an act of foreclosure rescue without entering into a written agreement
specifying what one or more acts of foreclosure rescue will be completed;
( c)
inducing a person who is at risk of foreclosure to hire the licensee to engage in an
act of foreclosure rescue by:
(i)
suggesting to the person that the licensee has a special relationship with the
person's lender or loan servicer; or
(ii)
falsely representing or advertising that the licensee is acting on behalf of:
(A) a government agency;
(B)
the person's lender or loan servicer; or
(C)
a nonprofit or charitable institution; or
(d)
recommending or participating in a foreclosure rescue that requires a person to:
(i)
transfer title to real estate to the licensee or to a third-party with whom the licensee
has a business relationship or financial interest;
(ii)
make a mortgage payment to a person other than the person's loan servicer; or
(iii) refrain from contacting the person's:
(A) lender;
·
(B)
loan servicer;
(C)
attorney;
(D) credit counselor; or
(E)
housing counselor;
(23) as a principal broker, placing a lien on real property, unless authorized by law; or
(24) as a sales agent or associate broker, placing a lien on real property for an unpaid
commission or other compensation related to real estate brokerage services.
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Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, CV1811.
CVl 811 Concealment or fraudulent non-disclosure.
I have determined that [name ofplaintiffJ was in a [type of relationship]
that gave [name of defendant] a duty to disclose an important fact to [name
of plaintiffJ. You must decide whether [name of defendant] failed to
disclose an important fact. To establish that [name of defendant] failed to
disclose an important fact, [name of plaintiffJ must prove all of the
following:
( 1) that [name of defendant] knew [describe the important fact] and failed to
disclose it to [name of plaintiffJ;

(2) that [name of plaintiffJ did not know [describe the important fact]; and
(3) that [name of defendant]'s failure to disclose [describe the important
fact] was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiffJ's damages.
References
Anderson v. Kriser, 2011 UT 66.
Gilbert Development Corp., v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361.
Yazd v. Woodside, 143 P.3d 283 (Utah 2006).
Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 561 (Utah App. 2007).
Committee Notes
This instruction should be given only if the Court has determined that a
special relationship imposing the higher duty is established as a matter of
law. Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 561 (Utah App. 2007).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REPEREX, INC., et al.,
MINUTE ENTRY
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 110916924

vs.
Judge Todd Shaughnessy

CHILD, VAN WAGONER, BRADSHAW,
PLCC, et al.,
Defendants.

Before the court is Defendants Coldwell Banker Commercial, NRT and Duane
Bush's (''Caldwell's") motion for judgment on the pleadings. · The court reviewed the
moving and opposition papers and heard oral argument on September 18, 2012. At that
time, the court stayed the case, and deferring ruling on the motion, until the Utah Court
of Appeals issued its decision in a related case then pending before that court.

On

October 24, 2012, Coldwell filed a Request to Submit for Decision, notifying the court
that the Utah Court of Appeals had issued its opinion in the related case, and requesting

a ruling on the pending motion. Based on the papers filed and the arguments of counsel,
the court now rules on Caldwell's motion as follows:
Plaintiffs have asserted three claims for relief against the Coldwell defendants, for

fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. Coldwell argues these

1
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claims are barred by a non-reliance clause in the broker agreement. The underlying
facts are essentially identical to those in Ruf, Inc. v. Icelandic Investments, Inc., 1999 WL
33244779 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), in which the Utah Court of Appeals determined that the
purchaser of a business could not, as a matter of law, rely on statements made by a
broker in the .face of an identical non-reliance clause. Thus, based on the logic and
reasoning of Ruf, plaintiffs' ~laims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation fail as a
~

matter of law.

Coldwell's motion on these claims is granted and they are hereby

dismissed with prejudice.

Neither the Ruf. case nor the other cases dealing with the

reliance issue involve claims for breach of fiduciary duty. The court is not persuaded at
this point that a non-reliance clause operates in the same fashion in this context. For
that reason, the court declines at this point to dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Caldwell's motion on this claim is therefore denied.
This minute entry is the order of the court, and no additional order is required to
be prepared.
DATED this 31 st day of October, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 110916924 by the method and on the date
specified.

MAIL:

J SPENCER BALL 3690 EFT UNION BLVD #101 SALT

LAKE CITY, UT

84121

MAIL:
MAIL:
CITY

SHANE W NORRIS 9350 S 150 E STE 500 SANDY UT 84070
TRACY A WILDER 999 E MURRAY-HOLLADAY RD STE 200 SALT
UT 84117

10/31/2012

LAKE

/s/ AMANDA O L S ~

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 10/31/12 16:01:19

Page 1 (last)
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Shane W. Norris, #8097
Law Division of NRT, LLC
7730 S. Union Park Ave., Ste. 675
Midvale, UT 84047
Telephone: (801) 563-7606
Facsimile: (801) 563-7607
Attorney for Coldwell Banker
Commercial, NRT and Duane Bush
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

REPEREX, INC, a Utah Corporation,
BRAD BALL, and DAVID BALL,
Plaintiffs,
V.

;.;j

CHILD, VAN WAGONER, BRADSHAW,
PLLC, a Utah Professional Limited
Liability Corporation, J. RUSSTON
BRADSHAW, COLDWELL BANKER
COMMERCIAL, and DUANE BUSH,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS COLDWELL
BANKER COMMERCIAL AND DUANE
BUSH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Civil No. 110916924
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy

Defendants.

On or about January 17, 2014, Defendants, Coldwell Banker Commercial and
Duane Bush (hereafter collectively AColdwell Banker@) moved for summary judgment
against Plaintiffs Reperex, Inc., Brad Ball and David Ball (hereafter collectively
APlaintiffs@). Coldwell Banker=s Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Parties= respective briefing on Coldwell Banker=s Motion for Summary Judgment

~
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was completed on or about February 12, 2014. A hearing was held before this Court on
March 19, 2014. At the hearing the Court entered its Ruling on Coldwell Banker's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
After having fully analyzed the pleadings on file and after having received oral
argument on the matter, the Court finds and holds as follows:

1.

The Court is of the opinion that under Utah law, expert
testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care
owed by a particular profession where the duties of the
particular profession are not within the common knowledge
and experience of the average person.

2.

It is not within the knowledge of the average person what
particular duties and responsibilities a business broker would
owe in connection with analyzing or transmitting information
to a prospective buyer. Nor is -it within the common
knowledge of the average person as to the extent to which a
broker would be obligated to potentially employ leagues of
experts in various disciplines to be able to analyze the data
and information, such as financial records, that is provided to
the business broker in order to understand the information
and be able to know whether there is a duty to relay the
information to a party in the transaction. Therefore expert
2
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testimony is required to establish said duties in this matter.
3.

Plaintiffs failed to name an expert witness to establish the
duties of business brokerage Coldwell Banker Commercial
and business broker Duane Bush.

4.

Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court holds that the
Plaintiffs must have expert testimony to establish the
standard of care to be applied to Coldwell Banker under the
facts of the case and to assist a jury in determining whether
Coldwell Banker's conduct satisfied the applicable standard.
and therefore Plaintiffs' sole remaining cause of action for
Breach of Fiduciary Duty fails as a matter of law.

BASED UPON THE FOREGOING IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Coldwell Banker's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and
Plaintiffs remaining cause of action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty is
dismissed.
DATED this_ day of_ _ _ _ _ _, 2014.

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Todd Shaughnessy
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:
3

~
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By: /s/ J. Spencer Ball
J. Spencer Ball, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff

By: /s/ Tyler S. Foutz
Tyler S. Foutz, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Child, Van Wagoner
& Bradshaw and J. Russton Bradshaw
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c;,

[Electronic signatures affixed with permission of counsel.]
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

COURT

I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of April, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS= COLDWELL BANKER COMMERCIAL
AND DUANE BUSH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served upon the
following via ECF:

J. Spencer Ball
Attorney at Law
3690 E. Ft. Union Blvd. #101
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
spencer@spenberball.com

Tyler S. Foutz
OLSEN SKOUBYE & NIELSON, LLC
999 E Murray Holladay Rd #200
Salt Lake City UT 84117
tyler@osnlaw.com
Shane W. Norris
Law Division of NRT, LLC
9350 South 150 East, #500
Sandy, UT 84070
shane. norris@utahhomes.com
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The Order of Court is stated below:
Dated: April 21, 2014
03:15:09 PM

Tyler S. Foutz, #10855
OLSEN SKOUBYE & NIELSON, LLC
999 East Murray-Holladay Road, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 365-1030
Facsimile: (801) 365-1031
Email: tyler@osnlaw.com
Attorney for Child, Van Wagoner & Bradshaw, PLLC,
and J. Russton Bradshaw
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REPEREX, INC., a Utah Corporation,
BRAD HALL, and DAVID BALL
Plaintiffs,
V.

CHILD VAN WAGONER & BRADSHAW,
PLLC, a Utah Professional Limited
Liability Company, J. RUSSTON
BRADSHAW, COLDWELL BANKER
COMMERCIAL, and DUANE BUSH,
Defendants.

FINDINGS AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT CHILD VAN
WAGONER & BRADSHAW AND
J. RUSSTON BRADSHAW'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Civil No. 110916924
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy

On March 19, 2014, the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Child Van Wagoner
& Bradshaw and J. Russton Bradshaw (hereinafter "Defendants") came before the court on

oral argument, with Defendants represented by their counsel of record, Tyler S. Foutz, and
Plaintiffs represented by their counsel of record, Spencer Ball. Based on the parties'

April 21, 2014 03:15 PM
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briefing and oral arguments submitted, and good cause appearing therefore, the court
issued a verbal ruling at the conclusion of the hearing, and now hereby finds and orders as
follows:
1. The Court finds that there are disputed facts with regard to Plaintiffs' Count I - Fraud.
The parties' conduct and knowledge at the time of the August 11, 2008 is factually
disputed.
2. The Court finds It is undisputed that Defendants and Plaintiffs were not in privity of
contract for the purpose of Defendants providing accounting services to Plaintiffs.
3. The Court finds It is undisputed that there is no writing from Defendants to either Mays,

Vi

Mays Custom Tile, or Plaintiffs in which it was asserted by Defendants that Plaintiffs were
entitled to rely on the ac~ounting services and information provided by Defendants to Mays
and Mays Custom Tile.
4. The Court finds that Utah Code Ann. § 58-26a-602 is applicable to this case.
5. The Court finds that pursuant to the operation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-26a-602,
Defendants cannot be liable to Plaintiffs for claims other than fraud or intentional

_j

misrepresentation due to:
a. the lack of privity between Plaintiffs and Defendants; and
b. the lack of a writing issued by Defendants which satisfies the requirements of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-26a-602(2)(b).
Based on the foregoing findings, the Court hereby Orders as follows:
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ORDER
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied with respect to Plaintiffs' Count I
(Fraud against Defendants).
2. Plaintiffs Count II (Negligent Fraud against Defendants) is dismissed.
3. Plaintiffs' Count Ill (Breach of Duty against Defendants) is dismissed.

** END OF DOCUMENT**

* COURT SEAL LOCATED AT TOP OF DOCUMENT*
Approved as to form:
/s/ J. Spencer Ball
J. Spencer Ball, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
/s/ Shane W. Norris
Shane W. Norris, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Coldwell Banker Commercial,
NRT, and Duane Bush
[Electronic signatures affixed on authorization by Mr. Ball and Mr. Norris]
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18TH day of April, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
L

FINDINGS AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT CHILD VAN WAGONER & BRADSHAW AND

J. RUSSTON BRADSHAW'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served by the
method indicated below to the following:

J. Spencer Ball
3690 East Fort Union Blvd., #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

April 21, 2014 03:15 PM

( x ) Electronic Filing Notification
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Overnight Mail
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( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Facsimile

Shane W. Norris
Law Division of NRT, LLC
9350 South 150 East, #550
Sandy, Utah 85070

( x ) Electronic Filing Notification
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Facsimile

Richard J. Armstrong
Brinton M. Wilkins
KIRTON MCCONKIE
50 E. South Temple
PO Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
rarmstrong@kmclaw.com

( x ) Electronic Filing Notification
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Overnight Mail
() Hand Delivered
( ) Facsimile

By: /s/ Dusty France
_,i

.I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on August 24, 2015, I served by planing in the mail, postage prepaid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, to the following:
Shane W. Norris
Law Division of NRT, LLC
7730 S. Union Park Ave., Ste. 675
Midvale UT 84047
Tyler S. Foutz
Olsen Skoubye & Nielson, LLC
999 E. Murray Holladay Road # 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

___

- -Isl Spencer Ball

__

..,..__
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